FEWS NET
Famine Early Warning Systems Network

Global Food Security Update: June to September 2025 June 23, 2025

This report serves as an update to FEWS NET's *May 2025 Global Food Security Update* and provides a broad overview of the current landscape of food security, with particular emphasis on major events that have occurred since last month and expectations for trends in acute food insecurity through September 2025. It is an interim report produced as FEWS NET resumes operations. While this update does not include sub-national IPC-compatible classifications or new estimates of populations in need, it still applies FEWS NET's rigorous analytical approach to assess acute food insecurity across covered geographies. In the coming months, FEWS NET will progressively restore its full suite of typical reporting.

Amid many complex crises, elevated response needed in Sudan and Gaza

Key messages

- In **East Africa,** conflict and weather shocks continue to drive severe and complex humanitarian crises. Food assistance needs remain most critical in **Sudan,** where extreme hunger and high levels of malnutrition and mortality are likely ongoing in areas of North Darfur and Khartoum. A rapidly escalating cholera outbreak, which is heavily concentrated in Khartoum, is expected to further accelerate levels of mortality. Needs are also pronounced in **South Sudan**, with highest concern for parts of Upper Nile and northern Jonglei region that would face extreme hunger, malnutrition, and mortality if ongoing conflict and anticipated flooding continue to cause disruptions to critical supply corridors and isolate populations for multiple months. Heightened concern also persists for populations in northern **Ethiopia** and north-central **Somalia**, where insecurity and drought are limiting household access to food, and for internally displaced and refugee populations in **Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda,** and **Burundi**.
- In the **Middle East and Afghanistan,** food assistance needs remain high across the region. The scale and severity of need is most extreme in **Gaza**, where expanded military operations and the operational challenges of the newly established Gaza Humanitarian Foundation food distribution system are still resulting in mass starvation, including high levels of acute malnutrition and hunger-related deaths. In **Yemen** and **Lebanon**, the long-term impacts of conflict, coupled with airstrikes on Yemen's port infrastructure, continue to undermine the economy and access to food. Meanwhile, in **Afghanistan**, the forced return of over 680,500 Afghans from Iran and Pakistan since January is saturating an already weak labor market, while an erratic spring rainfall season has compromised wheat production in several rural areas.
- In **West Africa,** conflict and insecurity, coupled with localized weather shocks, are expected to drive increased food assistance needs during the Sahel's lean season from June to September. Violent extremist organizations continue to expand territorial control, disrupt agricultural activities during critical planting periods, and impose taxation on farmers, particularly in **Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger,** and **Nigeria**'s North East region. In **Nigeria**, severe flooding early in the rainy season has resulted in over 200 fatalities and damaged key infrastructure, including the near-total destruction of a major trading hub between surplus-producing areas of the north and deficit-producing areas of the south.
- In **Southern Africa,** a favorable 2025 harvest is currently improving access to food in many areas. Most poor rural households will rely on own-produced food through September, but needs will rise in late 2025 as the lean season begins. However, food assistance needs remain elevated in the eastern **Democratic Republic Congo (DRC)** and **Mozambique**'s Cabo Delgado province, where conflict has significantly disrupted engagement in agriculture and economic activity, as well as in southern **Malawi** and eastern **Madagascar**, where there are weather-related shortfalls in crop production.
- In **Latin America and the Caribbean**, acute food insecurity is expected to worsen in **Haiti**, **Central America**'s Dry Corridor, and **Venezuela** between June and September. The scale and severity of need are highest in **Haiti**, where gang violence is driving mass displacement, heavily disrupting economic activity, and significantly impeding household access to food. In **Venezuela**, high inflation and reduced purchasing power are straining access to food, particularly among poor urban households. In **Central America**, interannual weather shocks have eroded agricultural productivity, leading to atypically low household food stocks among subsistence farmers as the lean season begins.

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Updates on the regional food security outlook through September 2025

East Africa

Food security is expected to deteriorate in East Africa from June to September, which coincides with the main lean season in **Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia**, due to the impacts of conflict and forecasted above-average rainfall and flood risks. Together, these hazards are expected to disrupt trade flows and market functionality, impede humanitarian access, and spread cholera, leading to widening food consumption gaps and rising levels of acute malnutrition. Within the region, acute food insecurity is the most severe in **Sudan,** where Famine (IPC Phase 5) will likely persist in Al-Fasher and neighboring Tawila localities in North Darfur through the lean season at a minimum. Extreme outcomes, including heightened mortality levels, are also expected in areas of Khartoum and the Nuba Mountains regions in South Kordofan through the lean season. In **South Sudan**, the scale and severity of food insecurity, acute malnutrition, and mortality are highest in parts of Upper Nile and northern Jonglei states; within this region, there is a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Nasir and Ulang of Upper Nile during the lean season, with rising concern for additional areas in the region, such as Fangak of northern Jonglei. High concern also persists for rural, internally displaced, and refugee populations in **Ethiopia** and **Somalia**, particularly in conflict- and drought-affected areas, as well as for newly displaced refugees from the DRC who have fled to Uganda and Burundi. Humanitarian food assistance remains critical to preventing food consumption gaps, elevated acute malnutrition, and associated mortality, especially in **Sudan** and **South Sudan**.

Sudan's conflict has evolved dramatically since May, as drone strikes carried out by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the east, including on Port Sudan and Khartoum, mark a seminal shift in RSF strategy and capacity towards remote targeting of critical infrastructure. The attacks on airport and energy infrastructure, including fuel storage facilities and power plants, threaten to severely disrupt the primary humanitarian supply corridor, commercial imports, and trade flows. In **Khartoum**, following the Sudan Armed Force (SAF)'s recapture of the Omdurman area in May, emerging evidence suggests sharply rising mortality amid a surging cholera outbreak, widespread hunger, and high levels of acute malnutrition, which were triggered by prolonged, siege-like conditions. Despite lingering insecurity, SAF's recapture of the city has encouraged tens of thousands of displaced people to return to their homes despite critical gaps in market, health, water, and sanitation infrastructure. The influx of people is straining very limited resources and increasing the risk of the spread of disease, which is likely to be further exacerbated during the upcoming rainy season. Meanwhile, the situation remains dire in parts of **North Darfur**, where the RSF's tightening siege on Al-Fasher town and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people following the April attacks on Zamzam and Abu Shouk camps are likely driving protracted Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Al-Fasher and surrounding areas. Escalating conflict in the **Greater Kordofan** region is also reigniting concern for a return to extreme food security outcomes in parts of Western Nuba Mountains during the lean season, as insecurity is disrupting the flow of commercial and humanitarian goods to the area and increasing levels of displacement. In addition, forecasts for an above-average rainfall season portend significant deterioration in humanitarian and commercial access to the area and the population's mobility due to flooding.

In **South Sudan**, political and military tensions have continued to escalate, with coordinated government assaults on opposition strongholds effectively dismantling the security arrangements of the 2018 peace agreement. Security conditions have considerably deteriorated in parts of Upper Nile and northern Jonglei, marked by aerial bombardments in Fangak and Tonga by the South Sudan People's Defense Force (SSPDF) in May and ongoing tensions in Ulang and Nasir. These developments, alongside large-scale population displacement and severe constraints on humanitarian access due to insecurity along key river supply routes, have led to a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in two of the most conflict-affected counties: Ulang and Nasir of Upper Nile. There is also heightened concern for extreme hunger, malnutrition, and mortality in other parts of the volatile Greater Upper Nile region. More broadly, the systematic targeting of armed opposition groups and associated ethnic communities — particularly the Nuer White Army and Nuer civilians — amid rising regional tensions underscores the continued risk of large-scale conflict. Should a reprise of large-scale civil strife materialize, it would sharply deepen the severity of South Sudan's food insecurity emergency.

Political and intercommunal tensions, territorial disputes, and insurgent activities also continue to underpin acute food insecurity in the Horn of Africa, with particular concern for **Ethiopia**'s **Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia regions**; **central**, **southern**, and **northeastern Somalia**; and the **northern** and **eastern** border regions of **Kenya**. In **Ethiopia**, over 700,000 people remain displaced in Tigray amid deteriorating political relations between federal authorities and regional authorities. **Kenya** continues to experience attacks carried out by Al-Shabaab along the border with Somalia, while **Somalia**'s transition from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) has created security vacuums exploited by militant groups, most notably Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State. Violence, coupled with flooding, has contributed to the displacement of 215,000 people from January to May 2025 — including an estimated 40,000 families in northeastern Somalia in March and April — driving the total population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Somalia toward 4.1 million.

While domestic conditions remain relatively calm within **Burundi** and **Uganda**, the escalation of conflict in the eastern DRC in February and March 2025 has driven tens of thousands of people into these countries in search of shelter and aid. More than 70,000 people have arrived in **Burundi** since January, while more than 66,000 people have arrived in **Uganda**, pushing the total refugee populations in these countries to 92,000 in **Burundi** and 1.9 million in **Uganda**. By the end of March, transit centers were already operating at 300-450 percent of their operational capacity, and humanitarian groups continue to express concern that basic shelter, health, food, protection, and resettlement services are overwhelmed as they strive to meet the refugee populations' immediate needs.

In the **eastern Horn**, the March-May/April-June rainy season has produced mixed crop and livestock production outcomes across the region (Figure 1). In **Ethiopia**, dry conditions since February have resulted in poor *belg* harvest prospects in crop-dependent areas in the north and center, while favorable cropping conditions generally prevailed in southern regions. In Arsi and West and East Haraghe zones of **Oromia**, the low *belg* rains have likely limited land preparation, and if rainfall remains low, it will jeopardize production potential in these areas. Low access to food and income during the June to September period is expected in eastern **Tigray** and **Amhara**, associated with poor *belg* rainfall and the likely extension of the typical March to May lean season. However, *belg* losses will most likely be partially mitigated by an anticipated above-average rainy season for *meher* crop production beginning in September.

Figure 1 **Rainfall as a percent of normal for East Africa from March 1 to May 31, 2025**



Source: UCSB Climate Hazards Center

Meanwhile, pastoral and agropastoral areas in **Ethiopia**'s **Afar Region** and **northern Somalia** are facing drought amid rainfall that was only 30-45 percent of average, heightening food and water insecurity risks. In northeastern parts of Afar, around 2,000 livestock deaths were reported as of early May, and as dryness has persisted since then, it is likely further livestock deaths have occurred. While dry conditions will likely ease in Afar and northwestern Somalia between July and September based on forecasts of above-average *karan/karma* rains, dry conditions are expected to intensify in northeastern Somalia, which does not receive these seasonal rains.

In contrast, **southern Somalia** and **Kenya** have continued to benefit from favorable rainfall for crop and livestock production, notwithstanding localized riverine and flash flooding. Seasonal harvests and food and income from livestock production are expected to alleviate the severity of food insecurity from July to September in these areas.

Similarly, first-season harvests are about to begin in equatorial areas of **Uganda**, **southwestern South Sudan**, and **Burundi**. In general, **Uganda** experienced delayed and erratic first season rains, which disrupted planting and forced replanting in central areas where crops are unlikely to reach maturity before the season's end. This development is expected to suppress **Uganda**'s exportable surplus for regional supplies, in addition to reducing the income of affected subsistence farmers. While **South Sudan** faced comparatively worse rainfall deficits in its productive cropping areas in the south and west during April-May, the impact is expected to be offset by more favorable rainfall during the subsequent second rainy season that begins in July. Further south, **Burundi**'s Season B crops benefited from adequate April-May rains, supporting typical yield prospects.

Looking forward, the latest rainfall forecasts for the main June-September rainy season in **Sudan**, **South Sudan**, **Ethiopia**, **northwestern Somalia**, **western Kenya**, and **Uganda**'s **Karamoja subregion** indicate above-average rainfall accumulation is most likely, which presents both opportunities and risks. Overall, the rains are expected to be beneficial for main season cereal cultivation and livestock production. However, there is a high likelihood that heavy rainfall will result in riverine and flash floods, with particular concern for severe flooding in conflict-affected areas of **Sudan** (similar to Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan in 2024) and in areas of **central** and **northern South Sudan** that host hundreds of thousands of refugees and returnees amid an ongoing cholera outbreak in both countries. Coinciding with lean season conditions, flooding is expected to wash out roads, disrupt the critical flow of commercial and humanitarian goods to remote areas, cause crop and livestock losses, and exacerbate disease outbreaks.

Food price inflation remains a persistent concern across the region, despite generally stable trends in global food prices and the adaptation of East African markets to external trade disruptions, including the Red Sea shipping crisis and ongoing risks to Ukrainian grain exports. Currency depreciation, the economic impacts of conflict, domestic and regional staple food production, and domestic economic policy decisions are the primary drivers of high food prices across the region. As of May, **South Sudan**'s pound (SSP) has depreciated approximately 250-300 percent year-on-year, with maize prices reaching 15,000 SSP per 50 kilograms (kg) in Juba markets. **Ethiopia**'s birr declined 15 percent year-to-date through March, contributing to 72 percent increases in rice prices and 60 percent increases in vegetable oil prices. In **Sudan**, the economic sanctions announced by the U.S. on May 22 have triggered parallel exchange market fluctuations, while cereal prices increased 13-24 percent between April and May in FEWS NET's monitored markets of Kassala, El Obeid, and Zalingei, and were 40-80 percent higher than a year ago (May 2024).

The prevalence of acute malnutrition remains of very high concern across **Sudan**, **South Sudan**, and the **eastern Horn**, where Serious (10-14.9 percent) to Extremely Critical (≥30 percent) levels of acute malnutrition among children under five years old are driven by a combination of hunger, disease, and both chronic and acute deficiencies in access to basic health services. As **Sudan** and **South Sudan** head into their peak rainy seasons, outbreaks of cholera and other diseases threaten to accelerate malnourishment and mortality in local, displaced, and refugee communities that are already suffering from large to extreme food consumption gaps. The rapid surge in cholera cases in **Sudan** warrants alarm, with over 7,000 cases reported in Khartoum State alone in the month of May, including over 1,000 children under five. Cholera also continues to spread in **South Sudan**, especially in Nasir County in Upper Nile State, with 1,059 confirmed deaths amid the largest recorded national outbreak of nearly 55,000 cases. **Ethiopia** simultaneously faces multiple disease outbreaks of measles, cholera, malaria, and the first recorded cases of mpox, with particular concern for cholera cases among Sudanese and South Sudanese refugees in Gambella Region.

The operational impacts of conflict and inadequate funding are hindering the scale and effectiveness of humanitarian food, nutrition, and health assistance programs. Recent and anticipated cuts to donor budgets for humanitarian assistance are compelling WFP, UNICEF, and their NGO partners to prioritize the most extreme needs, while reducing the size of rations that households receive, as is already occurring in **Kenya**, **Uganda**, and **Burundi**. As millions of people across the region face moderate to large food consumption gaps, even with targeted reprioritization plans, shrinking funds are expected to increase the difficulty of reaching logistically remote and hard-to-reach populations, cause shortfalls in the treatment and prevention of acute malnutrition, and make it more difficult to pivot when new pockets of extreme need arise in volatile contexts, such as in **Sudan** and **South Sudan**. The recent suspension of riverine transport due to conflict along **South Sudan's Sobat corridor** illustrates this risk, as it cut off the most cost-effective route for humanitarian supply flows to areas in the Greater Upper Nile Region. Meanwhile, in **Ethiopia**, stockpiles of ready-to-use therapeutic food and therapeutic milk to treat severe malnutrition are expected to be exhausted by July, while supplementary feeding programs targeting moderate malnutrition have already been suspended since March.

West Africa

Figure 2 **Besieged areas of the Sahel, as of May 15, 2025**



Source: ISW/Critical Threats - Liam Karr, using data from ACLED and Amnesty International

Humanitarian food assistance needs remain atypically elevated across the region due to conflict, localized flooding, and ongoing displacement. In the Sahel, the impacts of these shocks are expected to lead to a further increase in needs during the June to August 2025 lean season, as affected households have depleted their food stocks early and lack sufficient income to purchase adequate food amid atypically high food prices. In contrast, needs are expected to stabilize through September in parts of the Gulf of Guinea, where the first seasonal harvests began in May. Needs have likely increased atypically in parts of central and eastern **Burkina Faso** due to large-scale attacks by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in late May, as well as across northern **Nigeria,** due in part to escalating conflict in the North East and severe flash floods early in the rainy season. While forecasts for average rainfall over the main season support prospects for favorable crop development, localized flooding and conflict-related disruptions to cultivation pose a risk to the degree of improvement in food availability with the start of the main season harvest in September. Areas of highest concern across West Africa remain those affected by conflict, particularly in **Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger**, northeastern **Nigeria**, and areas of eastern **Chad** hosting Sudanese refugees.

At the onset of the June-September lean season, food stocks from the 2024 harvest are depleted for poor households, and dependence on market purchases is increasing. Poor households typically rely on seasonal income from agricultural and other types of daily wage labor to purchase food. In addition, agropastoral and pastoral households benefit from increased milk production and income earned from livestock sales. However, ongoing conflict, deteriorating macroeconomic conditions, and localized climatic hazards continue to constrain access to food. In particular, conflict is the greatest threat to livelihood activities and remains the primary driver of acute food insecurity across the region, as conflict restricts household movements and impedes access to markets, farmland, and labor opportunities. These impacts are particularly severe in areas controlled or contested by VEOs in the Liptako-Gourma regions of **Burkina Faso, Mali,** and **Niger** (Figure 2) and in North East **Nigeria.**

In **Burkina Faso**, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has continued to expand the breadth and depth of its influence across the country, including a series of coordinated attacks in mid-May that resulted in the temporary occupation of Djibo (Soum Province). In **Mali**, JNIM attacks also spiked in June and are increasingly reported in historically stable southwestern regions. Meanwhile, Islamic State Sahel is consolidating control around Ménaka and Ansongo in **Mali** and intensifying its presence in Tillabéri and Tahoua in **Niger**, where blockades and cross-border raids are driving displacement. These attacks took place at the beginning of the agricultural season, a time when agropastoral and farming households would normally start planting. The heightened insecurity during this crucial period is expected to delay and limit participation in agricultural activities, restricting seasonal labor opportunities and diminishing the outlook for the main harvest. While counterinsurgency campaigns are expected to continue across all three countries, levels of violence and civilian displacement are likely to remain high through September 2025. The spillover of conflict in the Sahel is also increasingly affecting coastal West African countries, including **Togo**, which currently hosts over 40,000 refugees from the Sahel.

In **Nigeria**'s northeastern states, attacks on civilians and Nigerian forces by VEOs escalated in the first half of 2025 as the Islamic State of West African Provinces (ISWAP) launched a series of coordinated attacks on military positions in Borno State, particularly the local government areas (LGAs) of Bama, Gwoza, Konduga, Kukawa, Marte, Abadan, and Ngala, which continued to experience the highest incidence of VEO violence. Furthermore, VEOs are increasingly limiting farmers' access to agricultural land by implementing levies. In the Lake Chad Basin, conflict persists in **Cameroon**'s Far North and **Chad**'s Lac Region. While the start of the first season harvest in **Cameroon**'s central and southern bimodal areas is improving household food availability and access, periodic separatist attacks on government forces and separatist-imposed lockdowns in Northwest and Southwest regions have continued to suppress engagement in agricultural production compared to normal, and limit physical access to markets to sell and purchase goods. In the **Central African Republic**, ongoing clashes between armed militias continue to disrupt livelihood activities, displace civilians, and restrict humanitarian access, particularly in the lead-up to the presidential elections in late 2025. In early 2025, targeted attacks on Sudanese refugees have further heightened intercommunal tensions, particularly in border areas where competition for mining sites and transhumance corridors has increased.

In eastern **Chad**, over 70,000 Sudanese refugees have arrived since April 2025 following increased violence in North Darfur, bringing the total to more than 850,000. The majority of recent arrivals are in Wadi Fira and Ennedi Est provinces, with nearly 18,000 estimated to be in the Tine transit camp. According to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) operating at the Tine camp, malnutrition among these new arrivals is at Critical levels, with a global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence of 29 percent among screened children under five years old. Overcrowding, insufficient shelter, and limited access to clean water, food, and healthcare are compounding humanitarian needs. Additionally, competition for scarce labor opportunities is reducing income-earning potential for both refugees and host-community households.

Economic conditions remain precarious across much of West Africa due to a combination of conflict-related disruptions, political instability, and broader macroeconomic pressures. In conflict-affected areas of the central Sahel, insecurity is a key driver of localized economic disruption as persistent violence and insecurity along main roads have restricted market function, raised transport and transaction costs, and increased dependence on military escorts or air deliveries to supply markets. These factors are contributing to atypically high food prices and severely limiting market access in areas under siege. For example, record-high food prices were reported in Diapaga (Est Region, **Burkina Faso**) in March 2025.

In **Nigeria**, macroeconomic conditions remain challenging despite the implementation of key structural reforms since 2023. Headline inflation remains elevated at 23.7 percent in April 2025, down from 24.2 percent in March, and following nearly 30-year highs in 2024. While the Nigerian *naira* has depreciated 7.9 percent year-on-year, the Central Bank's unification of exchange rates and repayment of foreign debts are widely viewed as corrective actions aimed at restoring investor confidence and longer-term economic stability. These reforms — alongside the recent increase in domestic fuel production following the operationalization of the Dangote refinery — are contributing to modest improvements in longer-term macroeconomic outlooks. However, the near-term impact has continued to result in reduced household purchasing power and persistently high staple food and non-food prices, particularly among urban poor and conflict-affected populations reliant on market purchases.

Several countries continue to maintain export restrictions on key commodities with the goals of protecting domestic supply and stabilizing local market prices amid elevated inflation and atypically high household and institutional demand, particularly during the lean season when domestic supply is at seasonal lows. In **Niger**, the government implemented a ban on livestock exports in May, purportedly in an effort to retain more animals for domestic sale and consumption. While this may support local meat supply in the short term, it significantly reduces income for pastoral and agropastoral households who rely on the higher margins obtained from cross-border livestock sales during this key marketing period, particularly in border areas with Nigeria. Similar restrictions in recent years have also targeted cereals and cash crops, such as maize, cashews, and onions, especially in countries like **Burkina Faso**, **Mali**, and **Chad**. These restrictions limit export opportunities for producers and traders, constraining both income and regional trade flows.

Between June and September, poor households depend on income from agricultural labor and anticipate the gradual start of harvests in September to replenish food stocks and gain income from crop sales. As of June, the first rainy season is underway across coastal countries and will begin across the Sahel as the inter-tropical convergence zone (ITCZ) progresses northward. Seasonal forecasts indicate near-average cumulative rainfall across the Sahel, and above-average flood risk is anticipated in riverine areas through at least September. In the Gulf of Guinea, below-average rainfall is likely during the first rainy season (April-July), with the most severe deficits to date observed across central Ghana and southern Benin, Togo, and Nigeria. Based on similar rainfall patterns observed in 2024, net cereal production in 2025 is expected to be similar to the five-year average regionally, with production losses in rainfall-deficit areas broadly offset by gains in areas where rainfall is favorable. Sub-regionally, losses in area planted and crop yields are expected in the most conflict-affected areas of northern **Burkina Faso**; central and northern **Mali**; Tillabéri and Tahoua regions of **Niger**; and northern **Nigeria**.

In late May, flash floods caused by heavy rainfall recently inundated Mokwa, a market town in north-central Niger State of **Nigeria**. At least 200 fatalities have been reported, with the death toll likely much higher. Rescue efforts are ongoing, with infrastructure damage — including roads and bridges — impeding access to affected areas. Mokwa serves as a critical hub for trade between southern markets and northern agricultural zones, and the flooding is likely to disrupt market flows and local livelihoods in the near term.

Humanitarian food assistance needs are expected to rise during the June to August 2025 lean season, driven by conflict, localized flooding, and ongoing displacement. Funding shortfalls remain a significant concern. In **Burkina Faso**, for example, donor-confirmed funding for food assistance in 2025 stands at 48 million USD, equivalent to just 17 percent of requested funding for food security, compared to 50 percent of requested funding that was secured in 2024. WFP, a primary implementing partner of food assistance, anticipates scaling back operations in conflict-affected areas of the central Sahel, as well as among refugee populations in Sudan and Mauritania, due to reduced resource availability.

Southern Africa

Food security conditions across Southern Africa are expected to be mixed through September. In **Angola, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique,** and **Zimbabwe,** the ongoing harvest is replenishing household food stocks and driving a seasonal decline in staple food prices as market supplies increase and demand subsides. In these countries, food security is expected to substantially improve relative to early 2025; however, the degree of improvement will be tempered in **southern Malawi, northern Mozambique,** and **eastern Madagascar,** where cereal crop yields were adversely affected by weather. Food insecurity is expected to remain elevated in conflict-affected areas of the **DRC** and **Cabo Delgado, Mozambique,** particularly where conflict is displacing populations and disrupting agricultural and market activities. **Eastern DRC** is the area of highest concern in the region, with concern for large food consumption deficits among poor and displaced households in North and South Kivu and Ituri provinces. As the August lean season approaches in **eastern DRC**, food access is expected to deteriorate further, and food assistance remains critical to prevent severe food consumption gaps, notably among displaced populations.

Harvesting activities are nearly completed across most of the region, and initial harvest estimates suggest generally favorable production. According to the Government of **Zimbabwe's** Second Round Crops, Livestock, and Fisheries Assessment (CLAFA-2) Report, maize production is expected to be around 260 percent higher than the 2023/24 harvest, when an El Niño-induced drought drastically reduced yields. The CLAFA-2 estimates that a national cereal surplus for the 2025/26 consumption year is likely; however, some districts are expected to face deficits as the lean season approaches starting in October 2025. In **Malawi,** a 10 percent increase in maize production compared to 2024 is projected; however, some subnational deficits are expected in the south and north due to irregular rainfall distribution and dry spells. In **Madagascar**, southern regions are experiencing favorable production conditions, while eastern areas have seen reduced yields due to a delayed onset of rainfall and dry conditions early in the season. Meanwhile, in **Mozambique,** the 2025 harvest output is expected to be mixed, with dryness, tropical cyclones, and conflict affecting production in the north, while in the southern half of the country production is expected to be favorable, associated with good rainfall. Cash crop production (particularly tobacco and cotton) has also performed well in **Zimbabwe** and **Malawi**. Lastly, winter wheat and second season planting is ongoing under generally favorable conditions in **Zimbabwe** and **Lesotho**.

Overall, the harvest across the region is driving seasonal declines in staple food prices in many areas, despite continued poor economic conditions in some countries, improving food access alongside the availability of own-produced foods. In most rural areas, poor households are currently consuming food from their own production and are expected to continue to do so through at least September. However, in **southern Angola**, **southern** and **northern Malawi**, **eastern Madagascar,** and **northern Mozambique,** some poor households in areas experiencing slight to moderate yield declines — caused by either erratic rainfall or heavy rains linked to tropical cyclones — will likely exhaust their own food stocks atypically early, leading to an atypically early dependence on market purchases to meet their food needs. Many poor households are expected to cope with reduced production by engaging in daily wage labor; however, there is concern that the availability of income-generating activities and/or coping capacity is lower in areas that have experienced repeated weather shocks (like southern Malawi) or protracted conflict (like Cabo Delgado). High food prices driven by inflation, notably in Malawi and Zimbabwe, are likely to decrease households' ability to access market foods as income-earning opportunities and wages remain relatively stagnant.

While the main season harvests **in Mozambique** and the Season B harvests **in northeastern and central DRC** are replenishing household stocks and market food availability in areas of relative calm, conflict in **the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique** and **eastern DRC** continue to significantly limit the scale of agricultural activities and disrupt households' physical and financial access to food. In **Cabo Delgado,** conflict has intensified since April, and displacement increased sharply in May. According to UNHCR, over 25,000 people were newly displaced in recent weeks due to violence. Conflict dynamics are expected to worsen during the dry season (June to October), as armed groups target villages for food and resources. This will likely result in further displacement, restrict access to fields, and constrain harvest activities, particularly in Macomia and surrounding districts. Food consumption deficits are likely to be predominantly among displaced households in areas worst affected by conflict, where households have limited access to markets and limited capacity to access or cultivate their fields.

Figure 3 **Areas of North and South Kivu, DRC under M23 control as of April 30, 2025**



Source: ISW/Critical Threats - Yale Ford and Liam Karr

In **eastern DRC,** many populations directly affected by conflict, including those who have been displaced as a result, are expected to continue to face food consumption deficits. The M23 offensive that escalated in early 2025 caused large-scale displacement and significantly disrupted key agricultural activities, including land preparation and planting, resulting in widespread reductions in Season A cultivation. Displacement has been compounded by widespread destruction of fields, looting, and the burning of cropland. As a result, many households have resorted to backyard gardening in secure areas, though yields from these small plots will likely meet an even smaller proportion of food needs relative to traditional farming methods. In areas under M23 control (Figure 3), new taxation and levies on both formal and informal trade have likely further reduced income from market activity. These taxes, including those imposed along trade corridors between major hubs such as Goma and Bukavu, are likely suppressing trade flows and contributing to rising staple food prices.

Households are not only being displaced within **DRC**, but they are also fleeing to neighboring countries, such as Burundi and Uganda.

Food security monitoring surveys conducted by WFP in February and March confirmed that the escalation of conflict in early 2025 had an immediate and direct impact on household food consumption; subsequent assessments by WFP in April and REACH in May found that acute food insecurity persists. In April, WFP reported that 35 percent of displaced and returned households had poor food consumption with nearly 30 percent of the resident population also reporting poor food consumption, though interpretation of these data is hindered by chronically poor dietary diversity due to typical high reliance on cereals, roots, and tubers. Around half of the surveyed population reported borrowing food or money to access food. Similarly, REACH's May assessment across key conflict-affected health zones in Walikale Territory indicated widespread displacement and severe hunger, with limited coping capacity among affected populations.

In March, WFP reached approximately 900,000 people with food assistance in and around Goma and Bukavu, the highest monthly caseload to date. However, humanitarian needs continue to far outpace aid delivery. Ongoing access constraints and funding shortfalls continue to hamper distributions, limiting WFP's ability to meet rising food insecurity.

Across the region, information on recent food assistance distributions and future plans is limited. Typically, large-scale distributions decrease by April or May as households gain access to food from their own production, and seasonal food assistance needs decline accordingly. However, food assistance remains necessary in several areas, particularly in conflict-affected zones of the **DRC** and **Mozambique**, as well as among some households in areas impacted by recent weather shocks elsewhere in the region. By September, food assistance needs are expected to gradually increase as the lean season begins across much of the region in late 2025, with the highest need in **DRC**.

Middle East and Afghanistan

In June, food security in **Gaza** is among the most severe globally and has notably deteriorated from already extreme outcomes. Systematic and widespread starvation persists despite the easing of Israel's prolonged blockade on food and other goods. Food insecurity remains high in **Yemen**, **Afghanistan**, and **Lebanon**, where persistent conflict-related disruptions, economic decline, and reduced humanitarian access continue to constrain household access to food. In **Yemen**, the impacts of port infrastructure damage caused by U.S. airstrikes prior to the May ceasefire and new Israeli airstrikes continue to disrupt trade and market functioning. Meanwhile, **Afghanistan** continues to struggle to absorb massive returnee influxes from Pakistan and Iran amid drought, poor economic conditions, and complete U.S. aid cuts. While the ceasefire has largely held in **Lebanon**, acute food insecurity has not notably improved since May amid high rates of returning populations and a weak labor market.

Levels of starvation are worsening in **Gaza** as Israel's expanded military offensive forces the population into increasingly isolated zones while severely restricting humanitarian access. Intensified airstrikes and demolitions have led to widespread displacement and further fragmentation of the Gaza Strip. Ground advances anticipated as part of Israel's new, expanded offensive, "Operation Gideon's Chariots," have yet to materialize fully, but the offensive aims to control 75 percent of **Gaza**, concentrating over 2.1 million Palestinians into increasingly dense areas. The military campaign has established five security corridors that effectively divide **Gaza** into isolated enclaves, with 664,829 people reportedly displaced since March 18. Over 80 percent of the territory now falls under evacuation orders or Israeli-militarized zones (Figure 4).

While the entry of humanitarian aid into **Gaza** partially resumed on May 19 following a 78-day complete blockade, humanitarian operations and access remain severely constrained. Of over 600 trucks cleared for entry, only 400 were collected by organizations, of which over half were looted in transit, with contents largely comprising wheat flour, nutrition supplies, select medical items, and water purification tabs. The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) mechanism was launched on May 27 through four distribution points in Israel Defense Forces (IDF)-held areas of southern **Gaza.** However, its implementation has resulted in chaotic and uneven distributions with several mass casualty incidents. Available information indicates Gazans continue to face significant food consumption gaps and severe nutritional deprivation. Households report consuming one meal per day, children going to bed early to avoid the conscious experience of hunger, and mothers dipping bread in water to create a feeling of satiation. Medical facilities have reported detecting starvation-related indicators such as ketones in over 40 percent of urine samples tested, the first significant detection since October 2024. The Ministry of Health reports at least 57 children have died from malnutrition since March 2, against the IPC's projections that 71,000 children under five will be acutely malnourished over the next 11 months.

In **Yemen**, recent attacks on critical port infrastructure risk severely constraining food import capacity and distribution systems, accelerating economic decline. Despite a U.S.-Houthi ceasefire announced May 6, Israeli strikes on May 16 and May 28 severely damaged the ports of Hodeidah and As-Salif — critical entry points for approximately 80 percent of **Yemen**'s food imports — and destroyed all remaining civilian aircraft at Sanaa International Airport. After Red Sea ports registered an 8 percent decline in import activity between January and April 2025, port operations have slowed markedly, with no new traceable vessel arrivals at As-Salif since early May and reduced activity at Hodeidah. While food imports through all Yemeni ports increased 14 percent between January and April 2025 compared to the same period in 2024, this improvement was entirely driven by increased traffic through the ports of Aden and Mukalla in Internationally Recognized Government (IRG)-controlled areas. Meanwhile, fuel imports through Red Sea ports declined 13 percent in the first four months of 2025 compared to 2024. Limited fuel imports pose significant risks to food distribution networks, as transportation costs increase and market access becomes constrained, particularly affecting remote and conflict-affected areas where food availability depends heavily on trucking operations. Current food reserves are estimated to cover national needs for only two to three months, creating significant vulnerability to further supply disruptions.

Figure 4 **Displacement flows in the Gaza Strip, as of June 11, 2025**

Source: CNN/FEWS NET

Food and fuel prices continue to rise in IRG-controlled areas, driven by the depreciation of the Aden-based rial (YER), which reached an all-time low of 2.441 YER/USD in May. The cost of the minimum food basket in these areas rose 5 percent month-on-month and 33 percent year-over-year, an all-time high. In areas held by the Sana'a Based Authorities (SBA), food and fuel prices, as well as the exchange rate, remain relatively stable due to the enforcement of government controls, though food prices are significantly elevated compared to last year. Concerns are growing around liquidity constraints in SBA areas, alongside potential financial and operational impacts from the recent designation of Ansar Allah as a Foreign Terrorist organization by the U.S. government, which analysts and INGOs in **Yemen** warn could affect remittances, banking operations, and both commercial and humanitarian imports.

Humanitarian food assistance levels are also expected to decline. WFP projects 4.8 million people are at risk of losing food assistance due to major funding cuts, while only 4 percent of the food security sector and 1 percent of the nutrition sector response plans are funded. These figures suggest that funding by the end of the year will be much lower than the 2024 levels of 45 percent and 93 percent, respectively.

Lebanon maintains relative stability following the November 2024 ceasefire but faces mounting challenges from reduced humanitarian assistance, continued displacement, and economic pressures. Approximately 981,400 people have returned to their communities while 82,632 remain displaced, with market functionality significantly improved but persistent inflation constraining household purchasing power. Funding shortfalls have forced WFP to cut cash assistance to 330,000 Syrian refugees in February, representing a 40 percent reduction from previous coverage, while emergency assistance for conflict-affected Lebanese households faces complete suspension without immediate funding.

Agricultural recovery remains constrained by conflict damage estimated at 821 million USD in losses and damages, with olive production particularly affected by a 12 percent decline in the 2024/25 harvest and 58 million USD in lost revenue. Also contributing to poor agricultural production is the below-average precipitation from the most recent season, driving down harvestable yields. Cross-border arrivals from Syria have increased pressure on northern communities, as the number of Syrians entering the area exceeded those leaving by 67,822 between early December 2024 and the end of May 2025, placing additional strain on services and resources. As market functionality stabilized in early 2025, price increases have been modest in recent months; however, in April, the cost of the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB)[1] remained relatively high with a 21 percent increase year-on-year, costing the equivalent of 492 USD for a family of five**.**

Afghanistan faces a dual crisis of massive returnee pressures and an end to U.S.-funded humanitarian aid, compounded by localized below-average wheat production prospects and a weak labor economy. Over 450,000 Afghans returned from Iran between January and May 2025. Iran announced a July 6 deadline for Afghans to self-deport, affecting up to 4 million undocumented Afghans, while Pakistan's deportation program has resulted in over 230,500 returns since April. These returnees are overwhelmingly from border communities already struggling with limited employment opportunities, where WFP estimates that full-time casual laborers can afford only 59 percent of their food basket nationally due to insufficient income-generating opportunities. The marginal economic growth over the past two years has not translated into tangible improvements in living standards for most poor households, and the economic outlook remains marginally positive in 2025.

The FAO projects national wheat production will reach 5.36 million metric tons, which is near average and 11 percent higher than 2024 due to favorable rainfall distribution during the winter wheat crop development period as well as improved seed and fertilizer distribution. However, significant regional variations threaten local food availability, particularly in northern areas. Inadequate precipitation since April and very low snow water equivalent levels are disrupting rainfed wheat production across northern, northwestern, central, and eastern provinces, with successive droughts particularly affecting Faryab, Jawzjan, Badghis, and Samangan. Despite favorable prospects for irrigated crops, many provinces in the north are experiencing below-average crop yields, while drought conditions are expected to peak in coming months with below-average precipitation forecast through August.

The termination of planned U.S. humanitarian aid, which totals 562 million USD for Afghanistan in 2025, has triggered widespread service closures, with 409 health facilities and 396 nutrition sites suspended as of April 29, affecting an estimated 3 million people and 80,000 women and children under five years old, respectively. WFP has been forced to reduce malnutrition treatment programs by 60 percent, leaving 1.2 million children and 500,000 women without treatment.

Latin America and the Caribbean

Acute food insecurity in the Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) region is expected to worsen during the June-September period due to the escalation of gang violence in **Haiti**, weather shocks in **Guatemala**, **El Salvador**, and **Honduras,** and the persistent economic crisis in **Venezuela**. In **Haiti**, surging gang violence is disrupting market functionality and income-generating activities, and leading to population displacement, especially in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (ZMPP), Petite Rivière in Artibonite, and Mirebalais and Saut d'Eau in Centre Department, which are the areas of highest concern. In **Central America**, household food stocks are seasonally low during the ongoing lean season.

[1]S/MEBs were established in 2014 and serve as a benchmark to estimate the cost of food and other basic needs of a Syrian refugee family in Lebanon. While the MEB is defined as what a household requires to meet its essential needs, the SMEB is the absolute minimum amount required to cover lifesaving needs. The S/MEBs are composed of three sub-baskets: food, non-food items, and non-food services.

Poor households, mainly in the Dry Corridor region, rely on the market to purchase food during this time, and food availability is expected to increase from August, when *primera* harvest begins. In **Venezuela**, the worsening economic crisis, with the inflation rate reaching 229 percent in May, primarily affects poor households in urban and peri-urban areas who are not beneficiaries of social safety net programs. U.S. tariffs, changes in U.S. immigration policy, and the announced 3.5 percent tax on remittances are expected to negatively impact countries' revenue and key economic sectors, such as agriculture, textile, and coffee in the LAC region and **Venezuela**. Humanitarian food assistance needs are expected to increase through September, particularly in **Haiti**, where intensifying gang violence restricts access to food and disrupts livelihoods. However, funding constraints limit the availability of food assistance. According to available data, in April, only 333,251 people in **Haiti** and 324,574 in **Venezuela** received food assistance (around 3 percent and 1 percent of the total populations, respectively).

In **Haiti**, gang violence continues to create widespread insecurity, driving population displacement, reducing market supply, and undermining income-earning opportunities. Since 2021, **Haiti** has lost 28 neighborhoods to gangs, mainly in the Ouest Department. Gangs continue to extend their influence outside of ZMPP, illustrated by frequent attacks in Petite Riviere in Artibonite and Mirebalais in the Centre Department. Gangs still maintain control of key trade routes connecting Port-au-Prince with other provinces, mainly Route Nationale #1 (RN1) to the north, Route Nationale #2 (RN2) to the south, and Route Nationale #8 (RN8) to the east, by installing checkpoints and illicit tolls. Despite the deployment of the Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission in Haiti, security has not improved, prompting the Haitian government to contract a U.S. private military contractor to use drones to target gangs. Additionally, in May, the U.S. government designated the two gang organizations — Viv Ansanm, a gang coalition, and Gran Grif — as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists, a move unlikely to lead to reductions in violence and its impacts on market supply and household livelihoods in the short term.

The number of IDPs has reached 1.28 million, a 24 percent increase since December 2024 (Figure 5). This surge is attributed to escalating violence in Mirebalais and Saut d'Eau (Centre department), Petite Riviere (Artibonite), and the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. The expansion of gang violence beyond the ZMPP is increasingly driving displacement in provinces that were previously relatively calm. As a result, about 77 percent of IDPs are located in the provinces and most of them are residing with host families. In contrast, 66 percent of IDPs in ZMPP reside in overcrowded displacement sites averaging around 2,000 individuals per site, where living conditions are likely worse and access to basic services is likely more limited. Additionally, deportations from the Dominican Republic surged to a monthly record of 34,190 people in May. Furthermore, following the end of temporary protected status (TPS) and the Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (CHNV) Parole Program for Haitians living in the U.S., an additional influx of Haitians returning from the U.S. is expected from June onward.

Figure 5 **Distribution of IDPs across Haiti, as of June 10, 2025**



Source: International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Amid persistent violence and high levels of population displacement, acute food insecurity is expected to remain widespread and severe despite the onset of the main harvest in June. While **Haiti** is heavily dependent on cereal imports to meet demand for staple foods, the harvest has historically played an important role in household food consumption, especially outside of ZMPP. Despite average rainfall and based on recent historical trends, a below-average spring harvest is expected due to the impact of gang violence on access to farmlands and the high cost of inputs and seeds, which have limited cultivated areas. The reduced harvest is expected to heighten poor households' reliance on the market for food and contribute to already very high staple food prices. In April, headline inflation stood at 26.8 percent, driven by food and non-alcoholic beverage inflation. Inflation for rice, the country's staple food, reached 31.1 percent (IHSI). Furthermore, remittances account for about 20 percent of **Haiti**'s GDP, and the U.S.-announced 3.5 percent remittance tax would further worsen the Haitian economy if enacted. A drop in remittances would pressure the exchange rate and make imports of food, medicine, and fuel more expensive.

In **Central America,** weather shocks continue to drive acute food insecurity, which is expected to worsen as the April to August lean season reaches its peak. The **Dry Corridor** remains the area of highest concern, where interannual weather shocks have eroded agricultural productivity among subsistence farmers over the past decade. As household food stocks are seasonally low at this time of year, most poor households are mainly purchasing their food using income from agricultural and casual labor. While the rate of food and non-food inflation is trending similar-to-lower than last year — with food inflation ranging from -0.63 percent in **El Salvador** to 4.54 percent in **Honduras** as of April/May 2025 — household income is a key limiting factor for food access amid high levels of monetary poverty, especially in **Guatemala** and **Honduras**. In **Guatemala**, staple food prices, such as rice, beans, and maize, were stable month-on-month in April, though the prices for rice and white beans remained above last year's prices, 10.33 and 36.89 percent, respectively. In **Honduras** and **El Salvador**, white maize prices were mostly stable, while bean prices declined compared to last year (FAO).

While the *primera* harvest is expected to alleviate food insecurity in August and September, the degree of improvement among subsistence farmers will be limited by crop yield losses. Adverse weather disproportionately affects poor subsistence farmers, whereas medium and large-scale farmers typically possess resources such as irrigation to mitigate the risks associated with unpredictable rainfall patterns. This year, *primera* season cultivation has been affected by delays in planting and crop moisture stress in localized areas due to below-average rainfall. In **Guatemala**, where cumulative rainfall deficits are both the most severe and widespread, cumulative rainfall in May was over 40 percent below average. Although weather forecasts indicate a rebound to average rainfall in June and a typical *canicula* (a seasonal period of reduced rainfall) in July and August, there is concern that erratic rainfall distribution and above-average temperatures will damage subsistence crops during their critical stages of development, therefore reducing yields for affected farmers. Erratic rainfall distribution is not only likely to be characterized by dry conditions, but also by short periods of high-intensity rains that may cause damage to crops via flash floods in localized areas, similar to what has occurred in areas of the region in May and early June.

Beyond seasonal drivers, the evolution of trade, remittance, and migration policies in the U.S. and the region hold potential to influence food security outcomes, though the impacts will more likely be felt beyond September. As the U.S. is a major trade partner for countries in **Central America**, the imposition of 10 percent tariffs would affect key sectors like agriculture, textiles, and coffee. By considering goods exempted from tariffs and goods subject to 25 percent tariffs (steel, aluminum, and auto parts), Honduras faces the highest tariff rate impact relative to its GDP, with an effective rate of 13 percent due to limited product exemptions. **Guatemala**'s reciprocal tariff affects its 5.7 billion USD in exports, posing a risk of reduced profit margins for small coffee producers. **El Salvador** faces a 10.5 percent effective rate due to an additional 25 percent steel and aluminum tariffs. Remittances are a source of income for many households in the middle and better-off wealth groups, which in turn stimulates demand for labor and services provided by poor households. In 2024, remittances accounted for 24 percent of GDP in **El Salvador**, 19 percent in **Guatemala**, and 26 percent in **Honduras**. During the first quarter of 2025, remittances surged compared to the five-year average, especially in **Guatemala** (increasing from 17 to 21 percent) and **Honduras** (from 13 to 20 percent). In 2025, remittances are expected to grow by 5 percent; however, with declining migration flows to the U.S. and ongoing deportations, projections on remittances may be revised downwards to grow only by 2 percent (The Dialogue). Given the substantial weight of remittances on the Central American countries' economy, a proposed 3.5 percent tax on remittances from the U.S., if enacted, could cost these countries up to one percentage point of GDP.

In **Venezuela**, where a prolonged economic crisis is the primary driver of acute food insecurity, household income and capacity to purchase sufficient food remains constrained by currency depreciation, high inflation rates, and low agricultural and industrial capacity. According to the Venezuelan Finance Observatory, the monthly inflation rate in May 2025 worsened and stood at 26 percent, while the annual inflation rate reached 229 percent. The national currency (VED) weakened, losing 13 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar. Economic growth is expected to decline by -3.5 percent by the end of the year. The economic crisis continues to drive significant emigration, mainly to Colombia; however, over 350,000 Venezuelan migrants who entered the U.S. under the Temporary Protection Status (TPS) program risk losing their legal status following a Supreme Court decision. As 90 percent of the population of **Venezuela** lives in the urban areas, the population of highest concern is very poor households who do not receive international remittances and those who do not benefit from social protection programs, such as CLAP (*Comités locales de Abastecimiento y Producción,* subsidized food boxes delivered to households) or the social safety net system.

Critical updates on the food security outlook through September 2025 in geographies of highest concern

Sudan

Following the recapture of Khartoum by the SAF in May (Figure 6) and gradual expansion of humanitarian access to previously inaccessible areas of the city, it has become increasingly evident that high levels of extreme hunger and severe malnutrition, coupled with surging disease, have likely led to atypically high mortality levels in areas of Khartoum, particularly in parts of Jebel Aulia and Omdurman, in recent months. Conditions remain dire as of June, with Omdurman at the epicenter of the rampant cholera outbreak, resulting in confirmed deaths from either starvation, disease, or a combination of the two. To date, conflict has prevented representative data collection on acute food insecurity, malnutrition, or mortality, limiting the availability of direct evidence to compare against the technical thresholds for Famine (IPC Phase 5).

Figure 6 **Areas of control as of June 1, 2025 (noting high degree of volatility along frontlines in Greater Kordofan)**



Source: Thomas van Linge, Sudan War Monitor

Parts of Omdurman and Jebel Aulia faced intermittent, siege-like conditions for much of the war to date, which restricted the population's mobility, caused severe food shortages, pushed food prices to extremely high levels, and led to a heavy reliance on over-stretched social support. In October 2024, MSF conducted a malnutrition screening in Omdurman among children receiving vaccinations and found that 7.1 percent of screened children were severely malnourished, double the severe acute malnutrition (SAM) prevalence (3.5 percent) recorded in the 2018 Simple Spatial Sampling Method (S3M) survey in Omdurman; while direct comparisons against IPC thresholds for acute malnutrition are limited by the screening methodology, the level of SAM is also comparable to the 8.2 percent observed in mass screenings conducted in Zamzam IDP camp in March 2024, which escalated to 10 percent in September 2024. While the SAF's expulsion of the last of RSF troops from Khartoum on May 20 has reduced the extent of heavy fighting, food shortages reportedly persist amid rampant insecurity. Armed gangs continue to terrorize civilians and loot markets and community kitchens in areas like Ombada of Omdurman, according to local Emergency Response Rooms.

Moreover, information collected in nearby areas strongly suggests that food insecurity and malnutrition remain extreme within parts of Jebel Aulia and Omdurman. In recent visits to Khartoum, WFP has reported high levels of extreme hunger in Jebel Aulia, though figures have not yet been released. In May, Save the Children interviewed key informants and focus groups in safe, accessible communities in neighboring Khartoum localities of Bahri, Jebel Aulia, and Sharg Al-Nile. In these areas, cases of communicable diseases (e.g., malaria, cholera, and dengue fever) are rising sharply and contributing to rising cases of acute malnutrition. At the same time, household food stocks are very low, food prices are very high, and income sources are scarce, making market purchases financially inaccessible and leading to heavy reliance on community kitchens for a daily meal. Given that parts of Omdurman and Jebel Aulia saw heavy fighting and rising criminality through May that restricted household mobility and cut off people’s access to food, clean water, and health care, outcomes are likely worse in the most severely affected parts of Omdurman and Jebel Aulia than in these more accessible areas.

Additionally, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) as well as health facilities — which had already nearly collapsed from two years of war — have been decimated further by RSF drone strikes in mid-May. The strikes took out three water and electricity transformation stations in Omdurman and damaged fuel storage facilities in Port Sudan, undermining backup solutions like trucked water and generators and causing multi-day blackouts. According to the Ministry of Health, only 10 percent of Khartoum’s water pumping stations and health facilities are operational. Confirmed cases of communicable diseases, including malaria, dengue fever, and cholera are surging as households resort to retrieving water from the Nile River due to the near collapse of water infrastructure. Available figures suggest that, in Khartoum alone, there have been over 7,000 cases of cholera, more than 1,000 of which are among children less than five; at minimum, the outbreak has so far led to 185 deaths reported in Khartoum since January 2025, with the largest surge in recent weeks (escalating from 90 cases per day to 815 per day between May 15-25). This is widely expected to be an under-accounting of the true burden of disease. The few remaining functional health facilities are severely overwhelmed, with patients reportedly being treated on the streets. Media reports indicate deaths are mounting rapidly, though it is difficult to ascertain the direct causes given the recent fighting and disease outbreaks. While Omdurman is of greatest concern within Khartoum as the epicenter of the cholera outbreak, there is growing alarm that the rapid spread of disease across the city during the rainy season will interact with hunger to accelerate mortality during the ongoing lean season.

A rapid, urgent scale-up in the humanitarian food, nutrition, and health response is critically needed to save lives as mounting needs have far outstripped available resources and humanitarian response to date. The end of active conflict in Khartoum has encouraged the rapid return of displaced populations to their home, rising from an estimated 34,000 returnee arrivals between December and the end of April to nearly 60,000 returnees by the end of May, including approximately 7,200 total returnees in Omdurman. While WFP reached over 100,000 people in Jebel Aulia in March and April with food assistance, no in-kind distributions have occurred in recent months in Omdurman, with only an estimated 80,000 people reached with cash assistance in March and April. Moreover, the surge in returnees and the scale of the current health crisis are fast outstripping the health response, particularly in light of the significant impact of funding cuts on the health sector response in Sudan broadly. According to the Sudan health cluster, 57 percent of health-related operations are at risk due to the funding cuts, estimated to affect millions by June 30, 2025.

Outcomes in Al-Fasher and surrounding localities in North Darfur remain of critical concern amid intensifying conflict, large-scale displacement from Zamzam camp to Al-Fasher town and neighboring areas, and the tightening siege of the town. Following the capture of Al-Malha to the north in March, Zamzam camp to the south in April, and a strategic border crossing with Libya in early June, the RSF has consolidated its control over major commercial and humanitarian access routes and escalated its attacks on the city since May. These developments have sharply reduced the already-limited flow of food and other goods into the city, placing further upward pressure on staple food prices and other essential items for survival. Given that these areas already faced extreme hunger, malnutrition, and associated mortality; the town is now subject to increasing isolation from commercial and humanitarian food supplies; and surrounding areas are absorbing hundreds of thousands of malnourished, repeatedly displaced people, it is considered likely that Famine (IPC Phase 5) persists in Al-Fasher and likely immediate surrounding areas of Tawila of North Darfur during the lean season.

The RSF attacks on Zamzam in April drove over 300,000 people to flee to neighboring Tawila Locality, but an estimated 84,000 fled to Al-Fasher town. Given that the town has been under siege-like conditions of varying intensity since March 2024, the influx of people has rapidly overwhelmed available shelter and local resources, with many people reportedly seeking shelter in public buildings or open spaces. At the same time, RSF has intensified its offensive against Al-Fasher town using heavy artillery shelling and multiple drone strikes, resulting in further damage to civilian dwellings, markets, community kitchens, and health facilities, and trapping thousands of civilians within the town and surrounding IDP camps, including Abu Shouk. Shortages of food, clean water, and medical care continue to be reported, pushing food and non-food prices in Al-Fasher to exorbitantly high levels: according to key informant market spot checks in May, cereal and non-cereal food retail prices are 270-300 percent and 280-500 percent higher in Al-Fasher market compared to main markets in Kassala and Gedaref, respectively. Furthermore, key informants report that access to cash is increasingly limited and costly, with frequent disruptions to banking and telecommunications systems and fees as high as 50 percent to withdraw money transfers.

Humanitarian access to Al-Fasher and surrounding areas also continues to be severely stymied, though convoys have periodically been able to deliver assistance despite the prolonged siege and active conflict. While WFP reported on April 25 that humanitarian supplies for 220,000 people had arrived in Tawila following the destruction of Zamzam camp, no assistance has made it into Al-Fasher since March. Furthermore, on May 30, a WFP warehouse in Al-Fasher was reported to have been hit and damaged by shelling, while on June 2, a convoy of 15 trucks with humanitarian supplies destined for Al-Fasher via Al-Dabba in Northern State was attacked, five aid workers were killed, multiple trucks burned, and humanitarian supplies damaged, preventing critical assistance from arriving in the besieged town.

After the easing of siege-like conditions in **South Kordofan** in early 2025 led to relative improvement in the population's access to food in areas of the Western Nuba Mountains, there is renewed concern that evolving conflict dynamics coupled with an above-average rainy season will lead to a resurgence of extreme hunger, malnutrition, and mortality in the Greater Kordofan region. As the conflict's frontlines shift westward, the severity of acute food insecurity in the region is of greatest concern among communities that lie along strategic trade routes, including the route between El Obeid of North Kordofan and Al-Debebate of South Kordofan, the route between El Obeid and Al Nuhud of West Kordofan, and routes within areas controlled by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) of South Kordofan. The El Obeid-Debebate route provides critical access to parts of West Kordofan (Al Fulah and Babanousa) and East Darfur (Ed-Daien), as well as southward to Dilling and Kadugli of South Kordofan; meanwhile, the El Obeid-Al Nuhud route provides access to Um Kadadda of North Kordofan. Since mid-May, territorial control in these areas has shifted frequently, displacing populations and disrupting commercial and humanitarian flows along these important routes.

This resumption of intense fighting to the north of territory held by SPLM-N has sent thousands fleeing into Nuba Mountain areas, which is likely placing increasing pressure on declining market and humanitarian food supplies as the lean season advances and the rainy season begins to impede supply flows. Humanitarians report that aid supplies are stuck in El Obeid, unable to move into West or South Kordofan given rising insecurity. While the alignment of SPLM-N and RSF has likely eased commercial flows of food into the region in the post-harvest period, key conditions are increasingly mirroring those of the lean season 2024 that resulted in Famine (IPC Phase 5) being declared in late 2024. In particular, prevailing insecurity and tensions along critical supply routes are increasingly cutting off the flow of goods and preventing humanitarian access, at the same time as the burden of displacement to the Nuba Mountains region is rising. In the 2024 lean season, these conditions, combined with heavy rains and flooding, compounded the inaccessibility to the area and led to Famine (IPC Phase 5). Access to the area must be preserved to avoid a similar trajectory during the 2025 lean season; there is particular concern for extreme outcomes among the displaced populations.

In parts of South, West, and Central Darfur, many households are already exhausting their food stocks as the lean season sets in. Physical and financial access to food is expected to decline further through September, driven by two consecutive years of low agricultural production, high levels of insecurity and violence against civilians, and disruptions to trade routes stemming from conflict and washed-out roads during the rainy season. The high and rising cost of food, coupled with erosion of income-generating opportunities and constrained access to fields due to conflict, will place persistent strain on already overstretched household and community coping capacity. Many of these areas are expected to experience levels of hunger and acute malnutrition similar to the 2024 lean season.

In eastern and central Sudan, the reduction in active fighting and return of over 1 million people — mainly to Al-Jazirah (75 percent), Sennar (20 percent), and Khartoum (5 percent) — offers a hopeful sign of stabilization in these regions. However, the toll of the war on public and private facilities and resources remains severe, and the rebuilding of infrastructure and recovery of productive assets is unlikely to occur quickly, given that government resources and attention remain focused on the war effort in other parts of the country. The anticipated continuation of drone strikes by RSF particularly threatens to further decimate the already severely damaged health, energy, and agricultural infrastructure, further undermining already slow recovery efforts. The over-burdened health system is currently of greatest concern amid widespread disease outbreaks, elevated levels of hunger and acute malnutrition, and the onset of the rainy season. Illustrative of these growing health risks, Ministry of Health officials in White Nile reported 2,700 confirmed cases of cholera, including 92 deaths, between January and May 2025, with peak cases reported in February and March; in Sennar, officials reported 80 cases and 6 deaths between April and June 2025. Looking forward, there is also high concern that farmers' ability to engage in cultivation this year will remain compromised by the destruction and looting of mechanized equipment and other productive assets (including livestock and seeds), the high costs of agricultural inputs, fuel shortages caused by drone strikes, and a lack of access to financing. In a recently released report, the Food Security Technical Secretariat of the Ministry of Production and Economic Resources of Sennar State highlighted these challenges and warned that the 2025/26 rainfed agricultural season is under serious threat. It is expected that the situation is similar in Al-Jazirah and White Nile states, all significant contributors to national food production in normal years. Overall, cultivation during the 2025/26 season is likely to be significantly lower than normal, particularly in areas that experienced high-intensity fighting, insecurity, looting, and displacement.

Humanitarian food assistance needs are expected to rise through the end of the lean season, with the greatest burden of need expected in Greater Darfur, Khartoum, and Greater Kordofan. Rising levels of severe hunger and acute malnutrition will be driven by continued conflict, displacement, and surging communicable disease outbreaks. In addition, weather forecasts indicate the 2025 rainy season will be above average, and the effects of heavy rainfall on road conditions are expected to interact with conflict to restrict the movement of people and goods. The public health crisis, as evidenced by surging cases of communicable diseases (particularly cholera), is especially alarming, as disease outbreaks have historically led to the high levels of mortality among populations weakened by hunger. The impending risk of heavy rain and flooding is likely to further exacerbate these disease outbreaks. It is considered likely Famine (IPC Phase 5) will persist in parts of North Darfur at a minimum. In particular, the populations in Al-Fasher and adjacent areas of Tawila of North Darfur, at a minimum, will face the most extreme outcomes, especially populations isolated within and recently displaced from Zamzam and Abu Shouk IDP camps and the town of Al-Fasher.

It remains imperative that comprehensive action is taken to scale up not only food assistance, but also nutrition, WASH, and health assistance to save lives. While humanitarian food aid continues to arrive in the country — for example, 32,550 metric tons of wheat arrived in the region in mid-May, destined for distribution in Sudan — the ability of WFP and partners to distribute this assistance to those most in need within the areas of highest concern will remain severely constrained by conflict, ongoing cash liquidity issues, bureaucratic impediments, and the anticipated deterioration in road conditions. Considering the recent direct attack on the aid convoy headed for Al-Fasher of North Darfur, it is increasingly critical that humanitarian corridors be established and protected to facilitate pre-positioning and distribution of assistance in the coming months. In Khartoum, concerted efforts must be made to repair the damage to electricity, water, and health infrastructure, restore health and WASH services, and stem the prevalence of disease. It is also essential to remove bureaucratic impediments to grassroots and humanitarian response mechanisms. Namely, the imposition of new registration requirements and fees threaten the ability of Emergency Response Rooms to function, risking a critical lifeline for many throughout the war, particularly in Khartoum.

Gaza

In May, food security in Gaza continues to deteriorate from already extreme levels of starvation as Israel continues to severely limit food availability and reduce food and essential non-food resources. While the delivery of humanitarian food assistance through the newly established GHF in IDF-controlled areas has provided food to a small proportion of southern Gazans in its early weeks, limited supplies, poor access, and high physical risk en route to and during distributions have prevented widespread coverage. This, in combination with Israel's newly-imposed ban on the distribution of UN food parcels and essential non-food items, continued restrictions on the entry of commercial food, the continued closure of WFP-supported bakeries, and the dwindling number of hot meals served daily, underscore the severely inadequate access to food and life-saving services to prevent high levels of acute malnutrition and widespread starvation in Gaza. In the absence of a substantial increase in the supply and delivery of humanitarian and commercial food, irreversible physiological impacts from acute malnutrition and additional hunger-related deaths are imminent, particularly in northern Gaza.

On May 16, the IDF announced the launch of an extensive military operation dubbed "Operation Gideon's Chariots," in which the military purportedly aims to dismantle Hamas and take control over most of the Gaza Strip. The planned operation would reportedly target Rafah, Khan Younis, and areas north and east of Gaza City. Since the announcement, the IDF has conducted high-intensity airstrikes across Gaza, including the heaviest bombing in Khan Younis since the start of the war and in Gaza City since November 2023, according to ACLED. As of early June, IDF operations continued to focus on airstrikes and controlled demolitions. By mid-June, Israel began reprioritizing some IDF air and ground assets in light of their launching a sustained attack on Iran, likely resulting in a delay of the expanded military offensive that was previously anticipated under Operation Gideon's Chariots.

Figure 7 **Israeli-militarized zones, areas under Israeli-ordered evacuation as of May 31, 2025, and GHF distribution points**



Source: Harvard Dataverse/Garb 2025

The IDF also continues to expand and fortify the Netzarim, Kissufim, Morag, and Philadelphi "security corridors," and has re-established the Mefalsim Corridor, which collectively partition Gaza into five isolated zones roughly divided by governorate and limit Gazans' access to critical infrastructure and humanitarian assistance (Figure 7). The IDF's plans include relocating the entire population into three isolated zones, including a southern coastal area (the Mawasi area), a portion of Deir al-Balah that includes Nuseirat, and the central portion of Gaza City (Figure 8).

The escalation of conflict since March 18 and the launch of the IDF's latest offensive against Hamas have led to 42 IDF-issued evacuation orders as of June 13, which cover all of Rafah and

North Gaza governorates and parts of Khan Younis, Deir al-Balah, and Gaza governorates. The orders have forced the renewed, mass displacement of at least 664,829 individuals as of June 11 into increasingly small and overcrowded areas that are largely devoid of essential resources or life-saving services to sustain the population. According to the UN, over 80 percent of the Gaza Strip's land was already within an IDF-militarized zone or under evacuation orders by late May.

Figure 8 **Distance (km) between GHF distribution sites (red dots) and concentrated areas of displaced populations (grey zones) in Gaza**



Source: Harvard Dataverse/Garb 2025

Alongside the new offensive, Israel continues to heavily restrict the entry of food into Gaza. On May 19, Israeli authorities partially lifted the nearly 80-day blockade of aid that had been in place since March 2, permitting the UN to start receiving select food, nutrition, and medical supplies at Kerem Shalom. However, food availability and the entry of food cargo remain extremely limited, restricted to meager supplies for bakeries and kitchens, and excludes UN food parcels, despite humanitarian partners reportedly collectively having more than 130,000 metric tons of food, enough to feed all Gazans for two months, pre-positioned outside of Gaza. According to UNOCHA, 673 trucks delivered cargo to Kerem Shalom crossing in southern Gaza from May 19 to June 4 (equivalent to just 42 trucks per day on average), but humanitarians were reportedly only able to collect 400 truckloads from the crossing for distribution due to insecurity, approval delays, and logistical constraints.[2] Of those trucks, only one-third to one-half reportedly reached their intended destination.[3] Looting of humanitarian cargo has reached prolific levels, attributable to both the desperation of a population experiencing starvation and organized seizure by IDF-armed Palestinian gangs. For example, WFP reported the looting of 15 trucks on May 23 and 59 trucks on June 9, both containing wheat flour en route to WFP-supported bakeries in southern Gaza. On May 26, trucks carrying lipid-based nutrient supplements (LNS) to northern Gaza were also looted, which would have served 1,000 children for one month.

Israeli officials have also placed new, more extreme restrictions on the entry, storage, and distribution of UN-coordinated food and nutrition supplies after they enter the Gaza Strip. First, the IDF has limited the number of humanitarian agencies that have authorization to bring cargo into Gaza. Second, only very limited wheat flour, hot meal supplies, some nutrition supplements, water treatment chemicals, and medicine are permitted for entry, as of June 3, according to the Logistics Cluster. Fuel, essential non-food items, hygiene supplies, and ingredients for UN food parcels remain banned. Third, there is a ban on UN-coordinated distributions of food parcels directly to households, and only UN-supported community kitchens and bakeries are permitted to distribute food. Fourth, it was temporarily prohibited to store most food or nutrition supplies in Gaza, requiring the UN and its partners to dispatch food directly to kitchens or bakeries for immediate

[2] According to WFP, 59 trucks were approved for entry by Israel's Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) through the northern crossing of Erez West/Zikim on June 10. However, all 930 metric tons of wheat flour were reportedly self-distributed by hungry civilians.

[3] According to WFP, of the initial 189 trucks dispatched from Kerem Shalom, only 94 made it to their intended destination. This was roughly corroborated by the IDF who indicated that, of 238 trucks being delivered, roughly half were looted.

distribution, risking spoilage and further looting; however, this was lifted in early June. Additionally, facilitation of aid movements remains heavily restricted by Israel; from May 21 to June 3, only 29 percent (43 of 146) of attempts to coordinate planned aid movements across Gaza were fully facilitated without impediment, according to UNOCHA. Taken together, these restrictions, coupled with the constraints of moving cargo through active conflict zones, have made it logistically infeasible to deliver and distribute sufficient food to the population to prevent mass starvation.

The distribution of meals and bread via community kitchens and bakeries has continued to plummet due to limited supplies and the surge in conflict and insecurity. In late May, multiple IDF air strikes hit community kitchens and bakeries in Khan Younis and Gaza governorates, disrupting food distribution and causing civilian fatalities. As of June 10, UN agencies reported that only 59 kitchens were functional and preparing around 246,000 meals per day, a number sufficient to feed just over 10 percent of Gazans daily.[4] This marks a 77 percent decline in meals since April 25, when 180 kitchens were still able to prepare over 1 million meals daily. Hot meal contents and ration sizes have also reportedly been reduced further due to a lack of supplies. Meanwhile, all 25 WFP-supported bakeries are currently closed. While five of the 25 WFP-supported bakeries temporarily resumed operations in late May following a delivery of flour, renewed insecurity and recurrent supply shortages forced the bakeries to close again by May 25.

On May 27, GHF,[5] a new organization established to replace the existing UN-coordinated humanitarian distribution infrastructure, began distributing food parcels at four food distribution hubs within IDF-held zones in southern Gaza in coordination with American private security contractors (Figure 7).[6] In the first two weeks of operation (May 27-June 9), GHF reported distributing 192,480 food parcels.[7] Based on available photographic evidence, food parcels weigh 20-25 kg and vary in their contents, with most containing rice, wheat flour, pasta, cooking oil, sugar, beans, canned vegetables, and various other items, such as biscuits, tuna, tahini, halva, or jam. FEWS NET analysis suggests the parcels contain an estimated range of 80,000-100,000 kilocalories (kcal) — of which 35-40 percent is sugar and oil — a total amount that would at best meet only 25-30 percent of daily caloric needs (2,100 kcal/person/day) for the 14-day period of distribution if it were evenly allocated across the population;[8] GHF has indicated the meals are designed to cover 1,750 kcal/person, or 83 percent of the recommended 2,100 kcal minimum daily requirement.

Regardless of the intended coverage of food parcels provided through the GHF mechanism, available evidence strongly indicates that GHF-coordinated aid is not reaching the populations most in need. The current first-come, first-served distribution system favors physically capable men, as long distances to the sites and severe crowding upon arrival have created life-threatening barriers to receiving aid for the most vulnerable individuals, with particular concern for households headed by women, children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities. Gazans who are already physically weakened by hunger, injury, or disease are expected to travel tens of kilometers on a weekly basis — often on foot through combat zones — to collect a 20-25 kg (44-55 pounds) box of rations from one of the four distribution hubs in IDF-held areas (Figure 8). As of June 12, there are no GHF distribution hubs in northern Gaza, where food access and availability remain the most scarce.[9] While formerly permitted UN-coordinated food parcel distributions also likely did not reach all vulnerable populations, the UN and its partners managed 400 distribution sites across all five governorates using

[4] Assuming a population of 2.1 million people remain in the Gaza Strip.

[5] GHF operates outside the UN-coordinated humanitarian infrastructure that was dominant in providing Gaza's humanitarian assistance before May 27. The UN and its partners have reported declining to partner with GHF for several reasons, including GHF's involvement of armed actors in food distribution and its breach of the humanitarian principles of neutrality, humanity, independence, and impartiality.

[6] Three distribution points are along the Morag Corridor, between Rafah and Khan Younis governorates, and one is near Nuseirat in Deir al-Balah, south of the Netzarim Corridor.

[7] GHF equates this to approximately 11.5 million meals, which they have defined as 1,750 kcal per person per day. GHF data suggests the number of meals per food parcel ranges from 55-65; however, meals are difficult to quantify as the contents of the food parcels do not make up conventional meals.

[8] The kcal in GHF food parcels are not allocated evenly across the population; this calculation is solely demonstrative of hypothetical coverage.

[9] GHF has indicated that it plans to open more distribution hubs in the future, including in northern Gaza, although the timeline and location are unspecified.

needs-based beneficiary lists, making UN-coordinated aid substantially more accessible to vulnerable populations than GHF's aid. Unmanaged crowds, poor operational procedures, and confusing public messaging about the sites' hours of operation have also been widely reported, as have multiple mass casualty incidents around distribution sites. Between May 27 and June 8, several mass shootings of Gazan civilians seeking GHF food parcels have been reported near Rafah and Deir al-Balah sites. As of June 11, the Gaza Ministry of Health reported that 224 people have been killed and 1,858 have been wounded in connection with GHF food distributions, though the figures have not been independently confirmed.

In addition, the contents of the GHF-designed food parcels are not fully ready-to-eat. Similar to the challenges that previously drove the UN to shift from food parcels to providing ready-to-eat rations and partnering with bakeries and community kitchens, the GHF parcels do not contain cooking fuel, clean water, or essential non-food items, including cooking utensils, extremely scarce resources in Gaza that are critical for food utilization. FEWS NET analyzed the contents of two food parcels and found that ready-to-eat items (items that do not require preparation to either consume or absorb the nutrients) make up only approximately 45-55 percent of the total kcal provided. However, this calculation includes both sugar and oil, which can be absorbed by the body raw, but are rarely consumed raw. When removing sugar and oil, just 5-20 percent of the GHF food parcels are ready-to-eat.

Given the protracted ban on commercial cargo into Gaza, market supply chains are on the brink of collapse, and markets are no longer a viable alternative to humanitarian aid. Shortages of goods, compounded by cash shortages, have resulted in nearly empty markets and record-high, volatile prices. According to WFP's monitoring of markets in Gaza and Deir al-Balah governorates, the price of a 25 kg sack of wheat flour more than doubled over a two-week period: from 875 new Israeli shekel (NIS) (~250 USD) per sack in mid-May to 1,750 NIS (~500 USD) by the end of May. Sharp increases in cooking oil and sugar prices were also observed, while the price of chickpeas is at its highest since the start of the war; vegetables, eggs, and meat remain largely unavailable. Cooking gas is also no longer available for purchase due to the IDF's sustained ban on its entry.

Collecting representative survey data on food consumption, acute malnutrition, and mortality in Gaza remains infeasible due to the escalating violence, mass displacement, and lack of sufficient humanitarian access. FEWS NET continues to base its analysis on a combination of food security indicators from non-representative telephone surveys, acute malnutrition screening and admissions data, and an estimation of the availability of and access to required kilocalories. All available evidence indicates extreme caloric deficits and poor dietary diversity are currently pervasive across Gaza, driving increases in levels of acute malnutrition and converging with anecdotal reports of rising mortality from hunger and malnourishment.

In June, WFP monitoring data identified a sharp deterioration in household dietary diversity to levels lower than those recorded prior to the early 2025 ceasefire and the lowest since the start of the war. In addition to a lack of dairy, meat, fruit, and vegetable consumption, household consumption of cereals, pulses, and oils is now also declining substantially and is lower than in December 2024, in all governorates. The Nutrition Cluster reported a substantial rise in GAM admissions among children under five in May, reaching 5,115 cases compared to 3,416 cases in April and more than double the number of cases recorded in February (2,055). Admissions in May are approaching the peak number of monthly GAM admissions previously observed in December 2024, when 5,436 children were treated for malnutrition during a 105-day, near-total blockade of food to areas of North Gaza Governorate and a period of critically low food supplies in southern Gaza. Additionally, the incidence of SAM cases needing hospitalization due to complications has doubled in May relative to March and April. While the only estimates of mortality from malnourishment are the 57 reported by the Gaza Ministry of Health from March 2 to May 13, a mounting body of anecdotal evidence, based on accounts from hospital staff, the media, and social media, suggests that this may be an underestimate of non-trauma mortality.

Gazans are currently facing systematic and extreme caloric deprivation, and levels of hunger, malnutrition, and mortality are expected to rise between June and September. In the May 2025 Gaza Strip Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) Special Snapshot, the Famine Review Committee cautioned that "even if essential supplies are permitted to enter, the quantity, distribution mechanism, and timing may be inadequate to prevent a rapid and uncontrollable collapse into famine."

Despite the commencement of GHF's food distribution, the insufficient coverage, inaccessibility, and high physical risk associated with these distributions, combined with the partial ban on the distribution of UN food parcels and non-food items, underscore the complete inadequacy of available food to prevent mass starvation. While starvation is expected to intensify across the entire Gaza Strip, it is highly likely that populations remaining in northern Gaza (estimated at 1,050,000 people as of May 6, 2025) are worse off relative to other locations given the current absence of GHF aid distributions hubs in the north, lack of functional stabilization centers to treat severe malnutrition in North Gaza Governorate since May 20, and extremely limited UN-coordinated food assistance for over 100 days as of June 13.

South Sudan

Tensions remain extremely high in South Sudan as renewed attacks in parts of Upper Nile and Jonglei displace populations and intercommunal clashes over livestock raids and revenge attacks have caused the death of hundreds, prompting a state of emergency in parts of Warrap and Mayom. According to the recently released IPC analysis update, the deteriorating situation in the Upper Nile and northern Jonglei region has led to the determination of a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Nasir and Ulang counties of Upper Nile as the peak lean season approaches and hunger typically escalates. FEWS NET shares concern about these counties and is also concerned about severe hunger in the counties of northern Jonglei, particularly Fangak, if ongoing conflict and anticipated flooding sustain recent disruptions to critical supply corridors and isolate populations for multiple months.

The ongoing conflict and high levels of insecurity in Upper Nile and northern Jonglei continue to displace populations and severely constrain humanitarian access. Since early May, fighting has again intensified along the Sobat corridor, with reports of ground offensives and aerial bombardment of towns and villages in Fangak of northern Jonglei and Tonga of Upper Nile, as well as further down the Sobat River in Ulang and Nasir of Upper Nile (Figure 9). Combined with earlier clashes, the fighting has displaced over 130,000 people within northern Jonglei and Upper Nile (mostly Ulang and Longochuk) between April 9 and May 28, and sent tens of thousands more fleeing over borders (35,000 into Gambella, Ethiopia, and 41,000 into war-torn Sudan). While new displacements were not noted in Nasir in April and May, most of those displaced by the conflict in February and March remain so.

Figure 9 **Clashes and population movement in South Sudan between February and May 2025**



Source: ACAPS

The mass movement of populations, including the returnee influx from Sudan, combined with very poor water, health, and sanitation conditions and the start of the rainy season is threatening to fuel a resurgence of cholera. According to the Nasir County Commissioner, seven patients have died recently of cholera in Nasir town and cases are suspected to be rising in rural areas with little to no access to healthcare. This follows South Sudan's largest ever-recorded outbreak of cholera estimated at nearly 55,000 cases and over 1,059 deaths between September 2024 and April 2025. These areas already faced high levels of food consumption deficits and persistently high rates of acute malnutrition in the harvest and post-harvest period: between September and December 2024, SMART surveys found a GAM prevalence measured by weight-for-height (WHZ) ranging from 25-27 percent in Manyo, Malakal Protection of Civilians (PoC) site, and Malakal County, and prevalence of malnutrition as assessed via mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) of 11.7 percent in Panyikang County, with confidence intervals near or exceeding the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds. According to the recent IPC acute malnutrition analysis update, three counties have been identified as likely facing extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition during the April-July period in Upper Nile: Nasir, Ulang, and Baliet.[10] The early depletion of household food stocks combined with continuing conflict-driven disruptions to household access to food and income sources is likely expanding severe hunger and malnutrition such that, when interacting with high burdens of communicable diseases such as cholera, it is likely to lead to increased mortality.

Humanitarian assistance remains severely constrained due to the insecurity along the Sobat River and parts of the White Nile River. Riverine transport is the primary route for transporting large quantities of in-kind humanitarian assistance to these areas, with the heightened volatility affecting deliveries to at least eight counties (Nasir, Ulang, Longochuk, Maiwut, Baliet, Fangak, Canal/Pigi, and Panyikang). On May 8, WFP and UNICEF released a statement indicating that unless riverine transport along the White Nile and Sobat River are secured, critical nutrition supplies for treatment of moderate and severe acute malnutrition in Upper Nile counties would be depleted by the end of the month. As of the time of this reporting, riverine transport has not resumed, suggesting needs are critically rising with depleted supplies. According to the logistics cluster meeting notes, an Upper Nile response plan is being coordinated through Akobo, with supplies routed overland via Bor and through Jonglei and waiting for distribution into southern parts of Upper Nile. UNHAS has provided airlifts of supplies to parts of Jonglei (Uror, Pibor), but given limited cargo space and cost (airdrop deliveries are roughly 15 times more expensive than road or river deliveries in South Sudan) it is not conducting airdrops. According to media releases, the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF) and a private firm have been airdropping 600 metric tons of food aid since late May, targeting Nasir and Ulang. While the contents of the food aid are not known, if comparable to WFP rations, this amount would provide 50 percent of daily kilocalorie needs for about 72,000 people, far below the estimated need. This would also be unlikely to reach those most in need given heightened risks of diversion by armed groups.

With households' stocks depleted from the last harvest, commercial and humanitarian flows disrupted, and market prices already high and rising due to a combination of deteriorating economic conditions, seasonal trends, and insecurity, poor households are heavily dependent on wild foods, but access is likely affected by ongoing insecurity. In May, prices for key staple commodities such as sorghum and wheat flour at sentinel markets along the Sobat corridor are double or triple the prices from one year ago, making markets financially inaccessible to the vast majority. Physical access for households and traders also remains threatened by the continuing insecurity and violence. In Fangak, recent attacks have directly hit markets. In Nasir, media reports indicate that commercial flows to the heavily looted Nasir town market have yet to fully resume. Rapid assessments conducted by REACH in Old Fangak town in March and May 2025 reflect the very high reliance on non-market sources of food, namely fishing, gathering, and (typically) humanitarian assistance amid the increasing strain on these limited resources. With the escalation in conflict and displacement of population in Fangak and surrounding areas in May and severely disrupted humanitarian access, these already strained local resources are being overwhelmed, further exacerbating food, water, and resource shortages.

The humanitarian situation in Upper Nile and northern Jonglei states remains extremely critical and is likely to continue deteriorating in the coming months due to a convergence of seasonality, conflict, displacement, disease, and access constraints. The areas already faced large food consumption gaps, high rates of acute malnutrition, and reduced coping capacity going into the lean season, when hunger and malnutrition typically peak. Barely recovered from a large-scale cholera outbreak, the upcoming rains, projected to be above average, are likely to compound the already extremely poor health and WASH conditions amid ongoing tensions, large-scale displacement, and the continued influx of returnees from Sudan, driving additional disease outbreaks. The recent funding cuts are expected to further hamper the necessary response scale-up, having hit the health sector response most intensively in South Sudan but also affecting WFP's planned lean season response: the agency has reported a 274 million USD shortfall against the 2025 operational plan. Without an immediate scale-up of multisectoral support and improved humanitarian access, the region faces a sharp increase in acute malnutrition, preventable disease, and excess mortality, particularly among the displaced. Overall, the systematic targeting of armed opposition groups and associated ethnic groups, particularly the ethnically Nuer White Army and Nuer civilian

[10] In Baliet of Upper Nile, nutrition data collected in Round 30 of the Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring Survey (FSNMS) in June-August 2024 led to the projection that malnutrition levels would be in the extremely critical range in the projection period between April and July 2025. This assessment has been sustained in the IPC analysis update conducted in April 2025.

communities, amid heightened regional tensions highlights the continued risk of large-scale conflict, which would sharply worsen the severity of the country's food insecurity emergency if such a scenario materializes.

Recommended citation: FEWS NET. Global Food Security Update: June to September 2025, June 16, 2025: Amid many complex crises, elevated response needed in Sudan and Gaza, 2025.